DURING HIS "top gun" photo-op aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln in May, Bush declared an end to major combat in Iraq, saying, "In the battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed.... In the images of celebrating Iraqis, we have also seen the ageless appeal of human freedom. Decades of lies and intimidation could not make the Iraqi people love their oppressors or desire their own enslavement."1
Bush was right: Lies and intimidation can't make the Iraqi people love their oppressors. But the past four months have shown that the liar, intimidator and oppressor of Iraq's people is none other than Washington itself.
For Bush, the summer has seen a string of embarrassing revelations--most prominently, the fact that his administration fabricated a lie about Iraq's supposed attempts to purchase "yellowcake" uranium from Niger in order to build a nuclear weapon. For National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, the claim about Iraq's purchase of uranium was "just one small justification" for going to war. In one sense, Rice is right. The faked Niger story was just one lie out of dozens that Washington told over and over again in order to whip up support for their war for oil and empire. These fabrications included, most famously, Tony Blair's assertion, now under some scrutiny in Britain, that Iraq could deploy its weapons of mass destruction in 45 minutes. The aim from the start was not to merely topple Saddam Hussein, but to occupy the country, seize control of its oil and use the country as a strategic base to extend tighter U.S. dominance over the region. It was never about "liberation."
All is not going as smoothly as Bush and his neoconservative advisers predicted. The truth can be seen now in the "new" Iraq--a country with a ruined economy, critical shortages of electricity, food and water, a brutal occupying army and a growing resistance to the occupation that is beginning to make things uncomfortable for the Bush administration both at home and abroad. More U.S. soldiers have died from armed resistance since Bush's May declaration than during the declared war, and discontent among soldiers is on the rise.
Today, as more and more pundits and ordinary citizens begin to talk of "quagmires" in Iraq (evoking images of Vietnam), the Bush administration has been forced, at least temporarily, to rethink how best to pursue their continued drive for military and economic domination around the globe. This article will examine the status of Iraq under the occupation, the development of resistance and the implications for the Bush administration.
The face of occupation
In August, L. Paul Bremer, III, the U.S.-appointed overseer of Iraq, gave the now-standard line about the benefits of U.S. conquest: "Each Iraqi is free to choose his or her own path. This is the meaning of the coalition's military victory. A new Iraq means new freedom."2 Today, however, freedom is a scarce commodity in Iraq--along with electricity, water, food and democracy. A quick look at the Bush administration's latest report on Iraq, "Results in Iraq: 100 Days Toward Security and Freedom," shows a nearly delusional gap between White House rhetoric about "liberated" Iraq and the on-the-ground reality of what is an iron-fisted occupation.3
Under the rule of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the U.S. and UK rulers running Iraq, the White House claims that "major strides" are being made in security, economic stability and democracy. The report lauds the fact that oil production is up, electricity is being distributed "more equitably," water is functioning at pre-war levels, health services are recovering and the Iraqi Interim Council is now governing. On every account, there is a huge gap between the stated "progress" of the U.S. occupation and the reality. When the report was released, the New York Times was moved to comment that, "The biggest problems have been airbrushed out of the White House report, making it read more like a Bush campaign flier than a realistic accounting to the American people."4
The Iraqi economy remains in ruins, with at least 50 percent--and by some estimates as many as 80 percent--of Iraqis without work. One solution to the unemployment crisis would be allowing Iraqis to rebuild their country, yet for all the Bush administration's promises about rebuilding Iraq for the benefit of the Iraqi people, today the main beneficiary of U.S. reconstruction in Iraq is the gaggle of politically connected U.S. corporations--like Bechtel and Halliburton--which continue to win multimillion-dollar contracts in the bid to privatize every last arena of Iraq's infrastructure.5 In the latest outrage, it is now being reported that WorldCom Inc.--which has never successfully built a wireless network and is best known for its corporate accounting scandals--is in line to win a $900 million Pentagon contract to build a cell phone system for occupied Iraq.6
Jodie Evans, a peace activist and organizer with the International Occupation Watch Center, summed up the attitude of U.S. reconstruction officials this way after returning to the U.S. from Baghdad in July:
I met the man who was hired to create a new civil government in Baghdad, to bring Baghdad back to order. His name was Gerald Lawson.... I asked him what he knew about Iraqis. He knew nothing, and didn't care to know anything. He didn't know their history, their government, didn't speak a word of Arabic and didn't care to learn.... He works for a corporation created by ex-generals. Their job is to create the new Iraqi government structure.
We met the man whose job is to make sure the hospitals have what they need.... He is a veterinarian.... I met the guy in charge of designing the airport, where major jumbo jets are supposed to land. He had never designed an airport before."7
Evans' comments paint a portrait of stunning arrogance on the part of the U.S. toward rebuilding a country that has been devastated over 13 years by war and blockade.
In Baghdad, a 15-minute walk from where Paul Bremer has set up shop in a luxurious, air-conditioned former presidential palace in Baghdad, shopkeeper Shamsedin Mansour summed up the frustration that many Iraqis must feel with their U.S. occupiers: "We have had no electricity for six days. Many of our people are suffering from heart problems because of the heat. We live with as many as 42 people in a house and do not have the money to buy even a small generator. Without light at night, it is easy for gangs of thieves with guns to take over the streets, and the shooting keeps us awake. If we try to protect ourselves with arms, the Americans arrest us."8
Today, electricity still has not been fully restored in the country--at a time when the midday temperature routinely hits 120 degrees-plus. In early August, U.S. officials announced that production of electrical power was going down, not up, and admitted that even when war damage to the power grid is repaired, the country will produce 30 percent less electricity than it needs.9
Clean water is also hard to come by in Iraq. In Baghdad alone, one post-war survey found that 40 percent of the water network was damaged, and that there were over 500 separate breaks in the distribution system.10 Chronic water shortages are also a consequence of the power cuts. Even when there is water, it is often not safe to drink. For weeks after the end of major combat, Baghdad did not have a single functioning sewage treatment plant--because of the damage caused by years of U.S. bombing and United Nations-imposed sanctions. Following the war, the World Health Organization reported a spike in cases of cholera and child diarrhea, due primarily to the lack of potable water. In one post-war assessment, UNICEF found that seven out of 10 children in Baghdad suffered from diarrhea, due primarily to contaminated water.11
The CPA says that it can have the water system fully operational by the beginning of Ramadan in October, but the sewage system is a different matter, because the main sewage treatment plants were stripped bare in post-war looting, and because the country's sewage plants rely on electricity to operate.
Today, the CPA cynically blames Saddam's "underinvestment," as well as looting and sabotage, for the delays in restoring essential services to Iraqis. But Iain Pickard, a British coalition spokesman, let slip the real reason for delays in early August. "The U.S. contractors have their own agenda and that is Washington's agenda," Pickard stated bluntly.12
That agenda doesn't seem to include getting Iraq's hospitals up and running in a timely manner, either. Today, Baghdad hospitals remain bleak places, plagued by constant problems with electrical and water supplies, as well as irregular deliveries of basic supplies like oxygen and anesthetics. According to Jim Haveman, the senior U.S. adviser to the provisional Iraqi Health Ministry, the main goal is to simply prevent epidemics.13
Even Iraq's oil industry--the most sought-after piece of the economy by the U.S.--remains in tatters. At its peak, and including routes through both Syria and Saudi Arabia that are now closed, Iraq's oil export infrastructure could handle output of around six million barrels per day. However, chronic power outages and sabotage have affected the oil industry as well; in mid-August the Iraqi oil ministry reported that power cuts had halved oil exports from southern Iraq and copper theft from electricity lines threatens to shut down exports from the region completely.14
Prior to the war, the Bush administration repeatedly argued that Saddam Hussein used the proceeds of the oil-for-food program to enrich his own regime rather than provide food and other necessities for the people of Iraq. Yet, because the war and subsequent occupation have disrupted what was an advanced and well-run system of food distribution, malnutrition has gone up, not down. According to UNICEF, a post-war assessment found that in Baghdad, acute malnutrition had nearly doubled from 4 percent a year ago, to almost 8 percent.15 At least one out of five Iraqi children continue to suffer from chronic malnutrition, and in late June, UNICEF reported that a staggering 100 percent of the Iraqi population had become dependent on food aid--where 60 percent were dependent on food aid before the war.
Many Iraqi women now enjoy less freedom than prior to the war. There are reports of a rash of kidnappings and rapes, and in response, some women are staying indoors, avoiding schools and have taken to wearing the veil. In May, the humanitarian group Save the Children reported that school attendance of girls had dropped by half. "Under Saddam, we were only afraid of Uday," said Baghdad resident Zeman Arkan, who has been forced to give up going to work because her family cannot ensure her safety during her commute. "Now, it's worse than under Saddam. There's no security for us."16
To the extent that any reconstruction is in the works, it is the kind that will line the pockets of U.S. corporations. The oil contracts are now well-known, but there are others in on the action. The Bush administration awarded Abt Associates, for example, a $43.8 million contract to "assist in stabilizing and strengthening the health system in post-conflict Iraq." In return, according to journalist Robert Fisk, Abt has declared that medical equipment must meet U.S. technical standards--meaning that all new hospital equipment must come from the U.S.17
The brutality and arrogance of occupation
Beyond the utter failure of coalition forces to provide for the daily material needs of the Iraqi people, there are the hundreds of examples of daily brutality and humiliation that ordinary Iraqis are subjected to under the heel of the U.S. occupation.
Although Iraqi casualties rarely merit attention in the U.S. news media, U.S. troops continued to sweep through major cities in June and July, conducting a series of brutal raids to disarm Iraqi civilians and round up what the Pentagon claims are "Saddam loyalists." In Operation Ivy Serpent, a U.S. sweep carried out in July, troops killed at least four Iraqis and arrested another 50 people.
For the most part, the Iraqis who have been caught up in U.S. sweeps are not high-ranking members of the Baath Party. Many are simply victims of faulty U.S. intelligence, or happen to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. In late July, for example, five people were killed in Baghdad's Mansour district by the elite "Task Force 20," the U.S. special forces team in charge of hunting down Saddam Hussein. Troops opened fire on several cars that mistakenly failed to stop for a U.S. roadblock. One car contained a disabled man named Mazin, his wife and teenage son. According to witnesses, a bullet from the volley of shots fired at the car passed through the windshield and blew off the right half of Mazin's head. "We consider the Americans now as war criminals," said Mahmoud al-Baghdadi, a 32-year-old baker. "They claim to be fighting terrorism, but they cannot defend freedom by killing disabled people."18
In this case, the U.S. refused to issue an apology. While acknowledging that several innocent civilians had been killed in the botched raid, the U.S. would not accept blame. According to Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, the head of allied forces in Iraq, "Apologies are not something that we have within military processes.... We acted on intelligence that we believed was sufficient."19
The utter brutality of raids like this have given the U.S. forces in Iraq a bad reputation and provoked such outrage that, just days later, Sanchez was forced to backpedal. Announcing that the military would be scaling back their raids, Sanchez told reporters that: "It was a fact that I started to get multiple indicators that maybe our iron-fisted approach to the conduct of ops was beginning to alienate Iraqis." He added that local Iraqi leaders working with coalition forces had said that they were unable to support the humiliating methods troops were using in conducting raids to round up those suspected to have ties to the former regime. The Iraqis' message, Sanchez said, is that "when you take a father in front of his family and put a bag over his head and put him on the ground, you have had a significant adverse effect on his dignity and respect in the eyes of his family."20
The indignity of the treatment of Iraqis by U.S. troops doesn't end there. According to reports by Amnesty International, many of the thousands of Iraqis being held captive by the U.S. military are kept in what amounts to concentration camps and are subjected to conditions that qualify as torture. "Detainees continue to report suffering extreme heat while housed in tents; insufficient water; inadequate washing facilities; open trenches for toilets; no change of clothes, even after two months' detention," Amnesty said.21
Amnesty also said it had received several reports of cases of detainees who have died in custody, "mostly as a result of shooting by members of the coalition forces."22 There are reliable reports that some children have also been rounded up and subject to similar treatment.
"If you keep them hungry, they'll do anything for us."
Army Col. David MacEwen, who helps coordinate civic works in Iraq, explained the "carrot and stick" methods employed by the occupation forces: "During ėpeninsula strike' [a huge operation of raids and arrests of more than 400 Iraqis in June] we worked very hard for every combat action to have a ėcarrot' that followed. We'd do a cordon and search in one area and then make sure the next day that LPG [cooking gas] was available, or that a pump at a water plant was working."23
The message to the Iraqis seems to be: If you want clean water, don't resist. If you want the things you need to live, don't resist. Activist Jodie Evans commented on what seems to be a deliberate strategy on the part of coalition forces to subject Iraqis to an iron-fisted occupation in the hopes that it will crush the spirit of resistance. Recounting a meeting with a man whose job was to collect intelligence for Paul Bremer, Evans said: "That professor I spoke to, the one doing the intelligence for Bremer, I told him that I had spoken to countless Iraqis and all of them felt this chaos was happening on purpose.... He basically said this was true, that chaos was good, and out of chaos comes order. So what the Iraqis were saying--that this madness was all on purpose--this intelligence guy didn't discredit. He said, ėIf you keep them hungry, they'll do anything for us.'"24
For ordinary Iraqis, this is the reality of occupation. The hollow promises of democracy are being exposed every day, and as the occupation continues, it will provoke more outrage and resistance among ordinary Iraqis--resistance that the U.S. has, in many cases, responded to in the most brutal way.
Take the recent shootings in Sadr City, a slum in northeast Baghdad occupied by Shiites. According to residents, on August 13, a U.S. Blackhawk helicopter attempted to tear down an Islamic flag from a telecommunications tower. When 3,000 angry residents poured into the streets in protest, U.S. troops opened fire on the crowd killing at least one and wounding several more--including a 12-year-old boy who was shot in the face.
The U.S. claims that troops were fired upon, but the incident was so outrageous, that the U.S. military was forced to apologize. "We deeply regret what has happened today. What occurred was a mistake and was not directed against the people of Sadr City," said Lt. Col. Christopher Hoffman in a letter distributed to locals.25 But it was not a mistake, it was the logical consequence of the U.S. occupation.
That logic was on display again on July 29, as some 1,000 Iraqis marched to the former presidential palace in Baghdad to protest unemployment. The protest, organized by the Union of Unemployed People in Iraq (UUPI), called for jobs for Iraqis and for unemployment insurance. At the palace, now used by U.S. occupation forces, the demonstrators staged a sit-in. As the sit-in continued into a second day, the protest was attacked in the early hours of the morning by U.S. troops. Ghasam Haadi, the UUPI's president, and 19 others were arrested. After a meeting with a protest delegation, the detained protesters were released, but according to the UUPI, on the fifth day of the sit-in, August 2, U.S. troops arrested 55 members of the group. They were only released when the UN intervened on their behalf.
The new rulers of Iraq--who's really in charge?
Yet another "stride" forward that the Bush administration points to in its 100-day occupation report is, "For the first time in the lives of most Iraqis, a representative government is being established and human rights and freedom are being enshrined."26
Even as the U.S.-appointed, 25-member governing council of Iraqis held its inaugural meeting July 13, ultimate control over Iraq--including veto power over the council's decisions--still rests with Paul Bremer. But it's not as if the council is likely to challenge Bremer's authority. It is made up of men like U.S. puppet Ahmad Chalabi of the Iraqi National Congress (INC), an embezzler who hadn't set foot inside Iraq for 45 years until April, and Wael Abdul-Latif, the U.S.-appointed governor of the oil-rich southern city of Basra. The council is so divided that it took more than two weeks to decide who would be in charge--with members finally deciding that the council presidency would rotate among nine different members.
While the Iraqi Interim Governing Council may get to do a few things, like come up with a new currency or declare new holidays, the reality is that Paul Bremer has veto power over all of the council's decisions. Right in the midst of the coverage of the new council, an anonymous "senior administration official" was quoted in the New York Times responding to the idea that other countries might want to have a share in the decision as to how Iraq's future oil revenues are spent. "It still hasn't entirely sunk into the international community," said the official, "but the CPA is the government of Iraq. There are already unfortunate misunderstandings on that, but I cannot underline that often enough. The CPA is the government of Iraq."27
Meanwhile, out in the streets of Iraq, the U.S. occupiers are increasingly turning to the very thugs that they're supposedly opposed to--former secret police under Saddam Hussein's regime--to keep order.
In late August, it was reported that occupation officials had embarked on a campaign to quietly recruit and train former members of Saddam Hussein's security forces in order to help isolate and identify those participating in anti-U.S. resistance. "What we need to do is make sure they are indeed aware of the error of their ways," an anonymous senior American official was, incredibly, quoted as saying.28 As the Washington Post put it: "U.S. officials...said they recognized the potential pitfalls in relying on an instrument loathed by most Iraqis and renowned across the Arab world for its casual use of torture, fear, intimidation, rape and imprisonment."29
The contradiction is galling. As left-wing author and activist Tariq Ali commented: "The only explanation provided by Western news managers to explain the resistance is that these are dissatisfied remnants of the old regime. This week Washington contradicted its propaganda by deciding to recruit the real remnants of the old state apparatus--the secret police--to try to track down the resistance organizations."30
The growing resistance to U.S. occupation
In the beginning of the U.S. occupation, the Pentagon was loath to give any credence to the idea that the U.S. would find itself increasingly in the midst of a hostile situation in Iraq. As shootings and mortar and rocket attacks became more frequent, the Bush administration repeated their standard response over and over again: The attacks were coming solely from the remnants of the Iraqi military, Saddam loyalists and, increasingly, "terrorists" slipping into Iraq from other countries. U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld went so far as to remark, searching for the right words to describe the conflict "I don't do quagmires."31
Today, it's openly known, if somewhat reluctantly stated, that the U.S. military is facing an increasingly organized guerrilla resistance. In early July, Gen. Tommy Franks admitted that coalition troops in Iraq face between 10 and 25 attacks each day. Gen. John Abizaid, Franks' replacement as the head of U.S. Central Command, acknowledged the situation as he told reporters in July that the U.S. was fighting "a classic guerrilla-type campaign.... It's low-intensity conflict, in our doctrinal terms, but it's war, however you describe it."
As the U.S. is finding out--regardless of Rumsfeld's reluctance to admit it--imperialism breeds anti-imperialism, and occupation breeds resistance. In July, when the U.S. announced the killing of Saddam Hussein's sons, airing graphic photos of the corpses, the Bush administration declared the killings would lead to "stability" in the country. Instead, it was one of the bloodiest weeks of the war, with a total of 14 U.S. soldiers killed in guerrilla attacks in an 8-day period.
The arrogance of the U.S. occupation will only continue to provoke outrage and hatred among ordinary Iraqis--outrage that will spill over, like it did recently in the southern city of Basra.
On a day with temperatures soaring to 125 degrees, electricity had been on for just four out of the previous 24 hours, and cooking gas was in such short supply that residents were forced to begin cutting down date palms for fuel. The anger boiled over into the streets, with residents throwing chunks of concrete and burning tires at British troops and the British soldiers firing warning shots to disperse crowds. "They did not give us what they promised, and we have had enough of waiting," 19-year-old student Hassan Jasim told Reuters.32
Though the riot was quelled after two days, British Lt. Col. Jorge Mendonca, told the New York Times, "You can see the frustration on the streets. I have the ability to sustain public order, but I'm not sure for how long."33
The character of the resistance
Following the declaration of the end of major combat in early May, journalist Robert Fisk suggested a picture of what was to come in the country:
Here is a little prediction. Mr. Bush says the war is over, or words to that effect. Then Shia resistance begins to bite the Americans in Iraq. Of course, Mr. Rumsfeld will have warned of this: it will be characterized as the famous "terrorist networks" which still have to be fought in Iraq. And Iran--and no doubt Syria--will be accused of supporting these "terrorists".... So stand by for part two of the Iraq war, transmogrified into the next stage of the "war on terror."34
Today, events in Iraq are unfolding along a similar trajectory to the one Fisk predicted. As this article was going to press, that resistance made its presence known. On August 26, a car bomb exploded in the city of Najaf, killing almost 100 Iraqis, including the Shiite Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim. Though four men who the U.S. claims are tied to al-Qaeda were immediately arrested, many commentators have been skeptical about the arrests, noting that it was unlikely that suspects could have been seized at the scene, given the confusion caused by the bomb and the almost total lack of police presence in the city.
Al-Hakim's death leaves a political vacuum that the U.S. will likely have problems filling. He had proven to be one of the most useful religious leaders in Iraq for the U.S. among the Shiite population. The head of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), an opposition group he founded in 1982 while exiled in Iran that retains ties to the Iranian government, al-Hakim did not support the war, but nevertheless was a moderate voice who had advocated patience and working with the Americans in the occupation. Although during his time in exile he had advocated that Iraq be reformed as an Islamic state, his most recent statements reflected less of a push for an Islamic state and fewer criticisms of the occupation itself. His brother, Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, sits on the Interim Governing Council.
While it is possible that the cleric was targeted by al-Qaeda members, radical members of SCIRI or, more likely, former Baathists, al-Hakim's death is a stark reminder of the political divisions still developing in occupied Iraq. It demonstrates the lack of an ability on the part of the CPA to build any kind of cohesion among various political and religious forces in the country, as well as the fact that those who are seen to work with the U.S. do so at their peril.
Further, al-Hakim's death is yet another black eye for the political authority of the U.S. in Iraq. Following the bombings, at least 300,000 Shiites demonstrated in Baghdad, shouting anti-American slogans and denouncing the Baath Party. Many blame U.S. forces for failing to protect al-Hakim. There were also fears of an outbreak of violence between Shiites and Sunni Muslims. Witnesses in Baghdad reported that 300 members of the Badr Corps--the armed wing of the SCIRI--left for Najaf wearing military uniforms and armed with guns and rocket-propelled grenades.35
"Things are going rotten, we are seeing a degradation for which there appears to be no remedy," said Simon Serfaty, a specialist at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. "American military power seems to unable to keep up with events in a country where everything is out of control."36
Some of the resistance to the U.S. presence is spontaneous in nature, with spur-of-the-moment demonstrations and riots over U.S. shootings, arrests and lack of supplies. In terms of armed resistance, while the Bush administration would like to claim that it is the result of al-Qaeda members, Saddam loyalists and Sunni Muslims, it is clearly broader than that.
As it appears today, the resistance can be characterized as a low-level, decentralized insurgency. It is centered, though not confined, mainly in Baghdad and surrounding areas to the north and west. As many as 40 political and religious groupings are estimated to be engaging in widespread acts of violence in order to compel the U.S. out of Iraq. 37
What shape the resistance will ultimately take is not clear, but as Ahmed S. Hashim of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies states:
Should Sunni resistance to and Shiite distaste for the presence of the U.S. in Iraq coalesce into a nationalist opposition, the paradigm here would be the nationalist rebellion of 1920 that united Sunni and Shiite against the British invaders. What should be worrisome from the American perspective is the growing coincidence between Sunni and Shiite nationalist views concerning the coming "pillage" and sale of Iraq by the U.S. and its allies. The more we see of a growing nationalist backlash followed by violence, the more likely we are to see the kind of quagmire that journalistic accounts have prematurely discussed since the eruption of fighting in the central Sunni belt.38
There is plenty of anecdotal evidence that the resistance does not consist solely of Saddam loyalists. One Iraqi named Walid told an interviewer that he joined a resistance group in Falluja not because he favored Saddam, or because he's anti-Western. Neither is he a Muslim fundamentalist. Initially, Walid was happy when the Hussein regime fell. However, when things did not improve under the U.S., and when he saw the attitude of U.S. troops first hand, during a short stint as a translator at an Army base, his hatred grew. "They come by with their weapons, in their military uniforms and then there is the bad treatment," says Walid. "They mistreat everybody equally, men and women. We have a tradition that women should not be mistreated, but they grab and touch them."39
The right to resist
The rise of the resistance to the U.S. occupation should be welcomed, for two reasons. One, because the Iraqis have a fundamental right to self-determination, and two, because increasing resistance helps to thwart Washington's plans in Iraq and elsewhere.
Outside of Iraq, there are those who, though they opposed the war, are not entirely clear on the question of the occupation. The arguments circulating on listservs and elsewhere have a layer of activists debating the question of whether an immediate U.S. pullout might produce "chaos"--including fractious internal disputes and the possible rise of an Islamic state. Alongside this goes an argument that some kind of UN-controlled occupation would perhaps be a way to ease a transition (timetable not specified) toward Iraqi self-rule.
This argument falls into the trap of placing conditions on the right of Iraqi people to determine their own fate. The Iraqi resistance is developing, in large measure because of the overwhelmingly brutal and undemocratic regime that the U.S. has set up in Iraq. To deny the right of self-determination--even if that self-determination takes the form of Islamic fundamentalism--is to accept the idea that an outside power has the right to dictate who should rule in Iraq. Yet this is the right of the Iraqi people alone. Self-determination for the oppressed isn't a reward for "proper" behavior. It's a fundamental democratic right. A colonial occupation--and there is no other way to describe what the U.S. has set up in Iraq--is inherently undemocratic, inherently detrimental to the people being occupied. "History does not record a single instance," remarked the Indian economist Romesh Dutt, "of one people ruling another in the interests of the subject nation." Antiwar activists who understand this must accept that the occupation should not last one more day, and must not cost one more Iraqi life. As soon as activists in the U.S. begin debating "when" and "how" the U.S. forces should leave, rather than demanding immediate withdrawal, they have accepted the idea that the U.S. has the right to occupy Iraq and that Americans, rather than Iraqis themselves, have the right to determine their future. Such a position therefore falls, willy-nilly, into a chauvinist trap. The only acceptable demand is U.S. out, and that the U.S. government should pay the Iraqi people billions of dollars in reparations for the massive devastation they have wrought upon them.
The choice is not between "democracy" if the U.S. stays longer and "fundamentalism" if it leaves. The U.S. was, and remains, a bulwarak of oppression and dictatorship in the region. A condition for ordinary Iraqis fighting for a better Iraq that serves the interests of Iraqi workers and oppressed--that is, the rebuilding of a genuine left and democratic alternative--is the expulsion of the U.S. Indeed, those who believe that the U.S. can be a bulwark against the rise of fundamentalism have it backwards. It is in large part U.S. backing of repressive regimes in the region, and U.S support for Islamic forces in the 1980s, that are in large part responsible for the resurgence of political Islam.
This is not to suggest that the politics of a fundamentalist movement are desirable. As Phil Gasper commented in the July-August issue of the ISR:
While socialists are adamantly opposed to the ideology and tactics of radical Islamists...and cannot regard them as allies, we also recognize that the main enemy remains the brutality of the international capitalist system and the imperial powers that benefit from it. Indeed, because Islamism primarily arises as a reaction to imperialism, socialists may sometimes find themselves fighting on the same side as the Islamists, although making no political concessions to them.... Political Islam will remain a force until a genuine left alternative reemerges in the countries where it currently has influence.40
The right of the Iraqi people to resist this occupation is paramount, and it is not the job of activists elsewhere to put conditions on this right. Should activists in the U.S. put themselves in the position of saying to the Iraqi desperately fighting the occupation--you are wrong, American and/or other troops should stay longer because we don't "trust" you to set up the "right" kind of regime. The Iraqi would rightly see this as colonialist thinking.
Against a UN "bluewash"
The call for UN involvement in the occupation as the lesser evil or as a means to prevent chaos justifies the continued domination of the Iraqi people and the theft of their resources at the hands of the U.S. For the U.S. will only accept UN involvement as an adjunct of the U.S. occupation. Moreover, a pro-UN occupation position is still a pro-occupation position. But the occupation is a product of a U.S. invasion--working backwards, such a position legitimizes the invasion itself. If chaos reigns in Iraq, the blame lies squarely with Washington for wreaking such destruction, and the United Nations, for keeping the Iraqis in utter poverty and misery under the sanctions. Anyone who knows the terrible toll that the sanctions took--one million dead, Iraq's infrastructure in shambles--should be skeptical of the idea of a "humanitarian" UN occupation. The UN already has a presence in Iraq, and it has already played handmaiden to the United States. UN Iraq envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello, killed in the August 19 blast at UN headquarters, was not in Iraq to promote humanitarianism, but to help cement U.S. control. As author James Petras notes:
De Mello was active in enticing tribal leaders, conservative clerics as well as exile prodigies of the Pentagon to form the junta [Iraqi Interim Governing Council], with the proviso that the U.S. colonial governor approved all of its members, and that all approved the U.S. invasion and occupation. In effect de Mello organized a powerless collection of self-appointed Člites who had no credibility in Iraq or legitimacy among the Iraqi populace, to serve as window dressing for U.S. colonial rule.41
Is it any wonder, then, that the UN was targeted?
Even if the UN were to take over the occupation completely it would continue to be an occupation of Iraq, against the will of the Iraqi people, by foreign powers--in this case, the other major world powers on the UN Security Council. It would be colonial plunder but by different plunderers.
As George Monbiot writes: "Until the UN, controlled by the five permanent members of the Security Council, has itself been democratized, it is hard to see how it can claim the moral authority to oversee a transition to democracy anywhere else.... A UN mandate may be perceived by Iraqis as bluewash, an attempt to grant retrospective legitimacy to an illegal occupation."42
U.S. troops
As the contradictions of the occupation become increasingly clear, it has an impact--not only on prompting the resistance of the Iraqi people, but also on the soldiers in the U.S. military as well. Despite whatever rosy picture the Pentagon might try to portray of the "commitment and resolve" of U.S. troops, even the one-dimensional U.S. press has begun to focus on the fact that many soldiers are increasingly frustrated and angry with their own treatment by the military.
Between May 1, when Bush declared "mission accomplished" in Iraq, and August 29, a total of 162 coalition troops--143 of them U.S. troops--were killed in Iraq. At least 64 of those were U.S. troops killed in hostile shootings, bombings or other attacks.43 That number is greater than the number of troops killed during major combat, and the attacks show no signs of letting up.
Among the non-combat deaths are at least seven suspected suicides and one death by caused by heat stroke. That statistic may not merit much notice in the mainstream press, however it is a telling indication that the material conditions of life for U.S. soldiers are much more difficult than originally anticipated by the administration. According to New York Times columnist Paul Krugman, as of mid-August U.S. troops were still eating MREs (meals ready to eat). Water shortages among troops have been reported, with each soldier apparently receiving two 1.5-liter bottles of water per day, a pitiful amount considering the average daily summer temperature of Iraq.44 According to Krugman, the military's shift towards privatization has meant that logistical support and supplies have, in some cases, failed to be delivered.
Further, while the health problems of U.S. troops who served in this latest war will not be known for years to come, there will inevitably be soldiers that suffer needlessly down the road. Again, in this war, the Pentagon insisted on using depleted uranium munitions, saying it was too valuable a weapon to give up, despite the fact that it is highly toxic, pollutes the environment for years to come and may be a contributing factor to Gulf War Syndrome--a collection of neurological disorders suffered by as many as 150,000 first Gulf War veterans.
In what may be a precursor to a new host of medical ailments, at least two, and as many as six, of the non-combat deaths during and following this latest war may have resulted from a type of pneumonia that struck more than 100 soldiers in Iraq and Southwest Asia between April and August. Several family members have said that they suspect illness was brought on by the anthrax inoculations that soldiers were given prior to shipping out. Though the Pentagon denies it, Stephanie Tosto, whose husband, Army Sgt. Michael L. Tosto, died June 17, commented: "I think they [the Army] might be lying about this stuff. I really feel like it. Nobody can tell me anything.... We just want to know what happened and we have a right to know. But the Army is acting like they are trying to hide something, and that just makes it harder."45
To add insult to injury, some soldiers' units have been told that they will need to stay in Iraq--after twice receiving orders to go home. In August, U.S. commander Gen. John Abizaid said that if and when international troops are deployed to Iraq, American troops will most likely remain in Iraq rather than being shipped home. The troops would be redeployed for a "more aggressive posture on external duties," such as securing borders, he said.46 This is a marked turnaround from May, when the Pentagon was still claiming that by the Fall only 30,000 U.S. troops would remain in Iraq.
The effect of the military's callous disregard for its own troops can be seen in the numerous reports of sinking troop morale. As one soldier wrote to Congress: "The way we have been treated and the continuous lies told to our families back home has devastated us all."47
"I've got my own ėMost Wanted' list," another commented to an ABC News reporter, referring to the deck of cards the U.S. government published, featuring Saddam Hussein and other wanted members of the former Iraqi regime. "The aces in my deck are Paul Bremer, Donald Rumsfeld, George Bush and Paul Wolfowitz."48
"What are we getting into here? The war is supposed to be over, but every day we hear of another soldier getting killed. Is it worth it? Saddam isn't in power anymore. The locals want us to leave. Why are we still here?" asked a sergeant from the U.S. Army's 4th Infantry Division.
These are just a small portion of the negative comments from U.S. troops that have been reported in the press, despite the best efforts of the Pentagon to prevent soldiers from voicing their frustrations.49 In the coming months, many more ordinary soldiers may be moved to start asking the same questions as they are forced to wonder what they are risking their lives for, as their own government treats them questionably.
Not only did the Bush administration refuse to consider a proposal that would have doubled the $6,000 death benefit paid to families of troops who die while on active duty, the Pentagon announced in August that it would be cutting the $75 a month increase in "imminent danger pay" and $150 a month increase in "family separation allowances" that had been approved for troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.50 This comes after the Bush administration's recent rejection of a proposal that would have doubled combat pay. Considering that military wages are so low that many soldiers and their families are on food stamps, the public outrage provoked by the plan to cut combat pay was foreseeable. An embarrassed Bush administration quickly changed its mind on the pay cuts, now declaring that the pay increase should be applied even more broadly to overseas troops.
As soldiers remain in Iraq with no end in sight to the occupation, it will lead more to question why they are risking their lives to protect U.S. oil and empire. This is not to suggest that the U.S. military in Iraq is yet facing a crisis on the scale that it faced in Vietnam towards the end of the war, when mass disillusionment and low morale among troops led to rank-and-file troops refusing to fight and follow orders, and sparked a series of attacks on officers, known as fraggings. But the disillusionment among troops could mushroom into a much larger problem for the military down the road.
Military families as well--promised that they would be taken care of by the Bush administration--are now also finding themselves under fire for not being "patriotic enough." One soldier's wife, after hearing about an attack on her husband's unit, sent an e-mail to the outfit's "Military Police Battalion Family Readiness Group"--which is supposed to provide solace and support for spouses of military personnel. In response, she received an e-mail saying that "certain people are getting their soldiers in trouble" and that the unit's e-mail list had been sent to the Pentagon "for possible security violations and will be closely monitored."51
In a follow-up e-mail, a spokesperson at the unit wrote that they "had to play hardball and get you to stop immediately because that fine line regarding breach of security was almost crossed." Finally, the spokesperson added: "You also have to remember that your loved ones volunteered to do this, they may have done it with the impression that they would never go anywhere because they are "Reservists," but they knew that was a possibility when they signed that dotted line."
Condescending attitudes like this have helped propel increased organizing among military families to end the occupation. August saw the launch of "Bring Them Home Now," a group of veterans, antiwar activists and more than 600 family members of active-duty troops, calling for an end to the U.S. occupation of Iraq and an immediate return of U.S. troops to their home bases. As Susan Schuman, whose son Justin is a sergeant in the Massachusetts National Guard, explains: "Our soldiers are demoralized. They are fighting an illegal and unjustified war.... Our troops have become oppressors and occupiers in a hostile nation."52
"It is easier to get into something than to get out of it"
The Bush administration will continue to portray the resistance to the U.S. occupation of Iraq as one more phase in the global "war on terror." Yet, whatever the stated aims, the underlying motives for pursuing war with Iraq were to further the project of U.S. imperialism. As the Bush Doctrine makes clear, the domination of Iraq is a key component of a policy aimed at securing U.S. military and economic domination regionally and around the world. With the war on Iraq, the Bush administration wanted not only to seize control of the country with the world's second-largest reserves of oil, but also to demonstrate to the world that the U.S. is willing to smash any regime or country that goes against Washington's will.
But as the occupation of Iraq becomes increasingly unpopular both in Iraq and domestically, and the coalition government finds itself unable to maintain order in Iraq, the drive of U.S. imperialism is, at least temporarily, slowed. Every option that the Bush administration might consider in order to bring stability to Iraq is, at least in some way, unpalatable for the Bush administration and the project of U.S. imperialism.
The U.S. could attempt to maneuver a new resolution from the UN which prompts other governments--including those of the Security Council that the Bush administration flouted in the run-up to the war--to contribute troops under the auspices of the UN, but under the direct military control of the U.S. Figures in the Bush administration recently suggested that such an option might be attractive, and as this article was going to press, Russian President Vladimir Putin signaled that he would support such a resolution. But again, "What UN member," commented Robert Fisk, "would ever contemplate sending peace-keeping troops to Iraq now?.... The most recent attack on the UN headquarters in Baghdad has slammed shut the door to that escape route."53
Even if the U.S. secures more UN involvement, there will be a political price to pay. Other Security Council members would not likely allow such a resolution to pass unless the Bush administration shared at least some authority in Iraq with the UN and cut member nations a "piece of the pie" in the form of some of the lucrative reconstruction contracts which today are virtually all in the hands of U.S. corporations.
The Bush administration could attempt to reform the Iraqi army, but that is an undesirable option as well, given the rhetoric about the Saddam loyalists (some of whom were presumably in the Iraqi military) being the roadblock to the smooth operation of the occupation. Additionally, the military is now being rebuilt, and is expected to number just 12,000 men by the end of this year, which is not enough to satisfy the needs of the occupation. There is also talk now of creating an Iraqi "paramilitary force" which "could ultimately take control of Iraqi cities from American soldiers"54--but this again will not be sufficient to police the occupation.
The U.S. may send more of its own troops, yet this will further contradict the administration's own stated assessment of the political stability of the country. Moreover, it will be difficult to sell this option to the U.S. public, which is becoming increasingly fearful of the situation in Iraq turning into a Vietnam-style "quagmire." It is also a difficult sell for the troops themselves, who will not be eager to join in occupying a country that so clearly has a developing resistance movement. This option would be a further embarrassment for the Bush administration, as it would be tacit acknowledgment that there is a developing resistance in Iraq that is not simply the work of "foreign terrorists" or Saddam remnants, and an acknowledgment that the situation in Iraq is far less stable than the U.S. would like to portray.
he administration officials say there is no need for extra troopsthey are essentially betting on the idea that the U.S. military can continue to absorb the political and economic costs of continued guerrilla warfare until such time as those attacks begin to subside. The problem for the Bush administration, however, is that those attacks are growing more frequent, not less, and becoming more organized and more effective, not less. Combined with what appears to be the development of a rising level of dissatisfaction towards the U.S. among the majority Shiite population--evidenced by the three days of anti-British riots in Basra that broke out in early August--it's a risky proposition, to say the least, for the administration to believe that it will ultimately be able to stamp out the unrest under their current plan for Iraq. The massive bombing in Najaf only increases the level of instability.
Withdrawal is not an option Washington can willingly accept. The precedent such an action would set would mean utter ruin for the project of advancing U.S. imperialism on which this administration has staked itself. Withdrawal under the present circumstances would be seen not only as a military defeat--perhaps not on the order of Vietnam, though significant nonetheless--it would also certainly be a political defeat for the Bush administration and a setback for U.S. capital, which has invaded Iraq with a ravenous appetite.
As the conservative Weekly Standard intoned, arguing for a large increase in U.S. troops, money and personnel for Iraq: "Make no mistake: The president's vision will, in the coming months, either be launched successfully in Iraq, or it will die in Iraq. Indeed, there is more at stake in Iraq than even this vision of a better, safer Middle East. The future course of American foreign policy, American world leadership and American security is at stake. Failure in Iraq would be a devastating blow to everything the United States hopes to accomplish, and must accomplish, in the decades ahead."55
The aims of the war on Iraq were not only to remove Saddam Hussein from power, but also to gain political leverage and strengthen U.S. imperialism by redrawing the map of the Middle East. As the occupation meets resistance, it has already become more difficult for the administration to pursue its aims of targeting countries like Syria, Iran and North Korea.
Those who were convinced by the "easy" victory in the combat phase of the war are now beginning once again to raise questions about the Bush Doctrine of "preemptive" wars and aggression. As former Secretary of State Madeline Albright commented: "instead of single-mindedly building on these gains [of the war in Afghanistan], the Bush administration has since steadily enlarged and complicated its own mission."56
Albright's criticisms of the Bush administration's policies are tactical, not fundamental. Her problem, for example, with the Bush doctrine is not its concept of "anticipatory self defense"--which she argues is "a tool every president has quietly held in reserve," but that Bush made it "the centerpiece of his national security policy." Albright herself felt that the war was justified--though Saddam was not an imminent threat and therefore could have been "contained" by non-military methods. She argues for a more multilateral occupation of Iraq and more "nation-building" in Afghanistan. "The challenge for the United States...is to frame a choice for Europe that most of Europe can embrace with dignity (if not always with France). To help this mission along, NATO should be used in Afghanistan (where it has finally gained a role, two years after September 11) and in Iraq, where its umbrella might help relieve the pressure on hard-pressed U.S. troops," she writes.57 Albright goes on to remind her readers of one of Donald Rumsfeld's own infamous "rules" for good public policy: "It is easier to get into something than to get out of it."
Perhaps she should also have invoked another of "Rumsfeld's rules": "Preserve the president's options. He may need them."58
Thanks to the resistance to U.S. occupation of Iraq, both at home and abroad, the president's options will remain restricted, at least in the immediate future. The task for those opposed to Washington's aims is to make sure that those options become even more limited--until the only choice the Bush administration has is to withdraw all U.S. forces from Iraq immediately.
Building resistance at home
What was supposed to be a fast, clinical war for the Bush administration has turned into a protracted occupation that is not only causing the morale of U.S. troops to plummet, but is also raising serious questions at home. An August 23 Newsweek poll found that 69 percent of Americans are concerned--40 percent are very concerned, while 29 percent are somewhat concerned--that the United States will be bogged down for many years in Iraq without making much progress in achieving its goals. Just 13 percent say that security and reconstruction in Iraq have gone "very well" since May 1. Sixty percent of those polled say the $1 billion per week that the U.S. is spending on occupying Iraq is too much, and that the Bush administration should scale back its efforts. Meanwhile, George W. Bush's approval ratings continue to decline, with his latest approval rating of 53 percent down from 71 percent from April.
Ultimately, what it will take--not only to get the U.S. out of Iraq, but also to put the brakes on U.S. imperialism--is for ordinary people in the U.S., Iraq and elsewhere to build a movement with the politics that can challenge the idea that the U.S. has the right to engage in empire-building--ever. Today, there is a wide opening to build precisely that kind of movement, in large part because the resistance of the Iraqi people--as well as the emergence of organized opposition from military personnel and their families--has forced the debate about the nature of the U.S. occupation onto a larger scale. Every day that U.S. troops remain in Iraq there will be more people who question why the Iraqi people are not free to decide their own fate. The Bush administration may be determined to wage its war on the world, but the arrogance of their occupation will continue to stoke outrage--both abroad and at home--that can fuel an opposition strong enough to stop their war machine.
1 Remarks by President Bush, "President Bush announces major combat operations in Iraq have ended," available online at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/iraq/20030501-15.html.
2 "Bremer takes on critics of U.S.-led occupation of Iraq," AFP, August 12, 2003.
3 White House report, "Results in Iraq: 100 days toward security and freedom."
4 "White House fantasies on Iraq," New York Times, August 14, 2003.
5 For a full account, see Rania Masri, "Reconstruction or deconstruction: The corporate invasion of Iraq," ISR 30, July-August, 2003.
6 Ted Rall, "No ethics? No experience? No problem!" Yahoo News, August 21, 2003.
7 William Rivers Pitt, "The crime and the cover-up," Truthout, July 21, 2003.
8 Patrick Cockburn, "Powerless Iraqis rail against ignorant, air-conditioned U.S. occupation force," Independent (UK), June 22, 2003.
9 Ken Dilanian, "Reconstruction process continues in Iraq," Knight Ridder, August 14, 2003.
10 "Iraq: Cleaning up neglected, damaged water system, clearing away garbage," available online at www.unicef.org/media/media_6998.html.
11 UNICEF report, "At a glance: Iraq."
12 Orly Halpern, "Iraqis gloat as North Americans suffer," Globe and Mail, August 16, 2003.
13 Daniel Williams, "Long road to recovery for Baghdad hospitals: Health care plagued by litany of shortages," Washington Post, August 17, 2003.
14 Michael Georgy, "Power cuts in southern Iraq halve oil exports," Reuters, August 14, 2003.
15 UNICEF report, "At a glance: Iraq."
16 Susan Milligan, "Iraqi women recoiling in fear of crime," Boston Globe, August 19, 2003.
17 Robert Fisk, "Iraq isn't working," Independent, July 31, 2003.
18 Jamie Wilson, "Victims of trigger-happy Task Force 20," Guardian (UK), July 29, 2003.
19 Vivienne Walt, "Bitterness grows in Iraq over deaths of civilians," Boston Globe, August 4, 2003.
20 Michael R. Gordon, "To mollify Iraqis, U.S. plans to ease the scope of its raids," New York Times, August 6, 2003.
21 "Amnesty: Iraqis complain of torture by U.S. forces," Reuters, July 23, 2003.
22 Ibid.
23 Thomas E. Ricks, "U.S. adopts aggressive tactics in Iraq," Washington Post, July 28, 2003.
24 Pitt, "The crime and the cover-up."
25 Andrew Marshall, "U.S. apologizes for sparking Baghdad protest," Reuters, August 14, 2003.
26 "Results in Iraq: 100 days toward security and freedom."
27 Steven R. Weisman, "U.S. seeks help with Iraq costs, but donors want a larger say," New York Times, July 12, 2003.
28 Anthony Shadid and Daniel Williams, "U.S. recruiting Hussein's spies," Washington Post, August 24, 2003.
29 Ibid.
30 Tariq Ali, "Liars couldn't expect bombs and flowers after bombs and occupation," Sydney Morning Herald, August 26, 2003.
31 Department of Defense news briefing, July 24, 2003, available online at www.pentagon.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030724-secdef0452.html.
32 Joseph Logan, "Riots erupt again in Basra, warning shots fired," Reuters, August 10, 2003.
33 Robert F. Worth, "Officials say shortages could cause more riots in Basra," New York Times, August 13, 2003.
34 Robert Fisk, "War over?" Independent, May 6, 2003.
35 "Bombing raises fears of sectarian violence," CNN, August 30, 2003.
36 "U.S. struggles in ėout of control' Iraq, experts say," Agence France Presse, August 29, 2003.
37 This characterization comes from Ahmed S. Hashim, PhD, "The Sunni insurgency in Iraq," Middle East Institute, available online at www.mideasti.org/html/perspective20030814-hashem.html.
38 Ibid.
39 Ferry Biedermann, "Portrait of an Iraqi rebel," Salon, August 16, 2003.
40 Phil Gasper, "The politics of Islam," ISR 30, July-August, 2003.
41 James Petras, "The politics of the UN tragedy," Rebelion, August 24, 2003, available online at www.rebelion.org/petras/english/030828un.htm.
42 George Monbiot, "Beware the bluewash," Guardian, August 26, 2003.
43 "Iraq coalition casualty count," available online at www.lunaville.org/
warcasualties/Summary.aspx.
44 Paul Krugman, "Thanks for the MREs," New York Times, August 12, 2003.
45 Mark Benjamin, "Widow fears Pentagon ėlying' on pneumonia," United Press International, August 21, 2003.
46 Peter Spiegel, "Staying in Iraq ėindefinitely,'" Financial Times, August 21, 2003.
47 Ann Scott Tyson, "Troop morale in Iraq hits ėrock bottom,'" hristian Science Monitor, July 7, 2003.
48 Jeffrey Kofman, "A big letdown: Soldiers learn they'll be in Baghdad longer than expected," ABC News, July 16, 2003.
49 The Third Infantry Division went so far as to end its "embedded reporter" program after an ABC story ran featuring negative comments about the occupation from its soldiers.
50 Edward Epstein, "Troops in Iraq face pay cut," San Francisco Chronicle, August 14, 2003.
51 Christian Davenport, "Military wife rebuked for e-mail," Washington Post, July 27, 2003.
52 Elizabeth Wolfe, "Campaign unites military families, veterans pleading to bring troops home," Associated Press, August 13, 2003.
53 Robert Fisk, "Iraq collapse," Independent, August 20, 2003.
54 Dexter Filkins, "U.S. and the Iraqis discuss creating big militia force," New York Times, August 31, 2003.
55 William Kristol and Robert Kagan, "Do what it takes in Iraq," Weekly Standard, September 1, 2003.
56 Madeline Albright, "Bridges, bombs or bluster?" Foreign Affairs September/October 2003.
57 Ibid.
58 Donald Rumsfeld, "Rumsfeld's rules," Wall Street Journal, January 29, 2001.
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